

## CHAPTER THREE

### CHILD PLAY: A PSYCHOPEDAGOGIC PERSPECTIVE

#### A. Particular anthropological categories of child play founded in the child's life- and experiential-world

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

One must continually keep in mind that openness is the most fundamental fact underlying child existence<sup>1</sup>. Play, as child activity, can only be understood if one fathoms the child in his involvement with reality.

It is meaningful that no antonym exists for "playing" in contrast to words such as "laughing" and "sitting". No doubt this can be explained by showing that the essentials of play are unique to the ways a person appears; play, in fact, is a fundamental tendency of being human<sup>2</sup>. Paul Moor<sup>3</sup> indicates that it is not possible to account for play as a purely psychological phenomenon. It does not necessarily have an origin or an aim outside of itself. Clearly, the origin of play is found in play itself. Play is primordially given and it is an obvious occurrence by and among persons.

Fathoming the phenomenon play allows one to see the child in his becoming as open possibility. The child cannot be described in terms of fixed rules or laws because he continually announces himself as possibility (potentiality). This announcing occurs via particular modes by which the child-as-openness gives form to the world to which he directs himself<sup>4</sup>. In this light, a search for anthropological categories of play is a search for the preconditions underlying the playing child as open possibility.

Here it should be noted that the forms of life in the primary life situation cannot be separated nor can the anthropological categories underlying child play. The child, as a functional totality, is in relationship to and in constant dialogue with his world. Anthropological categories, as expressions of the preconditions for this child-world relationship, are viewed as possible ways a child manifests himself to us as open possibility in his experiential world.

In differentiating among the particular anthropological categories, one must continually keep in mind their mutual connections and reciprocal implications. Intentionality and actualization, as specific categories, are described further because, in particular, they underlie the activity of child play.

### 3.2 INTENTIONALITY

A child who plays is conscious of a surrounding reality and progressively becomes more aware of it. As an act of intentionality, play is a matter of being-conscious of reality. Thus, it is a particular mode of being conscious. As an anthropological category fundamental to human play intentionality cannot be grasped unless the total structure of human consciousness is held in view.

Because openness is given with being-human it is an onticity, an undeniable fact of being, a primordial datum of human existence. As openness, a person is intentionality; as being-open-for he is intentionally directed to reality and faces the world in a relationship containing an appeal and, as a being-directed-to the life world, in a relationship of answering that appeal.

Since understanding a child's designing a personal life world, through reflecting on the phenomenon of play, holds a special place in this study it is necessary to clarify the concept life world, and especially the distinction between the personal life world of the child and the universal life world.

The personal life world is the naive, spontaneous life reality that is intentionally established and constituted by each person and that, in its turn, always is a potential experiential world. Life world, as potential experiential world, can thus refer to the universal as well as the personal life world.

Van der Stoep<sup>5</sup> also sees the foundation of intentionality in the conscious activities of a person. Intentionality is an act, an intentional activity<sup>6</sup>, an active going out to and entering the world. Since play also shows this structure it can be described as a particular mode of intentionality. The deeper essence and especially the sense and meaning of a playing-being-in-the-world is sought in the difference between act and functioning intentionality, a distinction first made by Kockelmans<sup>7</sup>.

### **(a) Act-intentionality**

In his playing-being-in-the-world a person always is intentionally, actively involved in the world. This intentional directedness is to something that is not consciousness itself and it is designated as act-intentionality<sup>8</sup>. This act is directed from the totality of a person and indicates an active participation directed to a matter, an object, an event<sup>9</sup>, e.g., by a playing-being-in-the-world.

### **(b) Functioning-intentionality**

Where act-intentionality refers to the active going out to the world, functioning intentionality refers to the meaning contained in a particular landscape, to the meaning a particular structure shows, and to the assumption that such a structure has a particular meaning<sup>10</sup>. A person is consciousness but he knows himself in dialogue with the world. Person and world are two abstract moments of one total structure, presence<sup>11</sup>. Person and world form a unity of mutual implication, and a dialectic relationship between them is necessary.

Meaning is the result of a real encounter between person and world in which both are involved. Functioning intentionality assumes that there is meaning in the object, matter, or event and, therefore, it is directed to discovering and ordering this meaning. Functioning intentionality is a meaning-giving, meaning-investing activity. Thus, intentionality essentially is an act of giving meaning. Child play, then, is a mode of functioning intentionality and can be understood as a mode of intentionality. Child play is a being directed-to and an openness-for the world. The initiative for establishing relationships resides with the child himself.

## **3.3 ACTUALIZATION**

The child is openness; i.e., he is someone who stands open to the world but also is directed to it. In other words, his being-in-the-world is characterized by intentionality as existentiality. As potentiality, he is neither finished nor predictable. That is, his positive potentialities must thrive and be actualized. The child himself has the greatest share in this and this is emphasized by mentioning self-actualization. This emphasis on self-actualization is necessary because the child will and must become someone (Langeveld). However, he cannot manage this on his own and, therefore, accompanied or guided actualization by the educator also is necessary. The child becomes ever closer to adulthood by means

of accompanied actualization, and, in this study, play is viewed as a particular mode of self- and accompanied-actualization of a child's becoming.

Becoming is essentially an elevation in the level of the child's living which means that he continually lives on higher levels that increasingly are more in agreement with particular demands of propriety. Through self- and accompanied-actualization, the implementation of responsibilities, meanings, choices and values is elevated<sup>12</sup>.

As a mode of actualization play is a primordial way of being and a fundamental form of child existence. Thus, from the beginning a child plays because he is a child. Play is one of the most essential modes of existence and form of actualizing his becoming. Consequently, a child who does not play also does not become because his level of living is not elevated.

Vermeer<sup>13</sup> distinguishes four levels of play, namely, sensopathic, handling, esthetic or constructive, and illusive or fantasy play. These four levels should be viewed as levels of becoming and if, e.g., a child does not engage in illusive play, or does so inadequately, according to Sonnekus<sup>14</sup> his becoming will be deficient because then the elevation mentioned will not occur.

It is relevant to emphasize that in the course of becoming, a child lived-experiences on all four levels of play and these moments of lived-experiencing are of a sensopathic, pathic, affective, sensognostic, gnostic, and cognitive nature. Play, then, clearly is a form or way of actualizing his becoming, and, according to Sonnekus<sup>15</sup> a child who does not play or who is handicapped in his play, for whatever reasons, becomes handicapped in his lived-experiencing as becoming. Thus, a non-playing child's lived-experience will show an attenuated becoming.

To play is only a potentiality and the initiative for playing is in the child himself. As a human being, as a person, he is intentionality and an appeal needs to be directed to him, as initiative, to improve (change) the non-playing relationship when he does not play. He may have all of the potentialities for play but nevertheless not play. It is an educative task to make such a child is a playing child.

An additional aspect of actualization is the fact that in the same way that potentialities in the world become open for the child, he becomes aware of himself as a new potentiality for acting. He becomes spurred on by affective and cognitive lived-experiences.

In playing a child always is bodily involved. Thus, corporeality as lived-bodiliness also is an essence of child play and thus of actualizing the essence of intentionality through play. In play the child is not merely a bodily, or psychic, or spiritual being but rather a functioning totality. This means that via play, he is involved with his whole being in his self-actualization.

Child play is characterized by movement. Lived-experienced movement in child play means there is a willingness to move, a mode of being that, according to Sonnekus<sup>16</sup>, only is possible for a person in the sense that only he can signify what he is and thereby break away and move in the direction of what he ought to be<sup>17</sup>. Therefore, play only can be pedagogically meaningful if it helps the child move from the ways he gives meaning to his world at a given time to new elevated ways, along with the responsibility that goes with this. Among other things, this means that with the help of play, the child's lived-experiences must continually be elevated. That is, he must gradually and progressively move away from child-like ways of lived-experiencing in the direction of more adult ways.

Sonnekus has effectively shown that "lived-experience" is a valid psychopedagogic category and it is discussed next.

## **B. Lived-experience as a psychopedagogic category and its significance for understanding child play**

### **3.4 LIVED-EXPERIENCE**

Play is a way of lived-experiencing and thus it refers, among other things, to the person's affective way of being-in-the-world, i.e., to his meaning-seeking attunement to his world<sup>18</sup>. Further, with reference to lived-experience as an activity, Pretorius<sup>19</sup> says that the concern is not with the fact that a person **has** a lived-experience but rather that he lived-experiences, and this is never passive. In addition, he states that especially Linschoten<sup>20</sup>, Sonnekus<sup>21</sup>, Lersch<sup>22</sup>, and Landman<sup>23</sup> strongly emphasize activity as an essential of lived-experience.

With respect to lived-experience as an act of intentionality, playing-being-in-the-world is a modality of this intentionality and clearly is an active way of lived-experiencing. Consequently, to acquire insight into play as a particular active way of lived-experiencing (and intentionality), the concept of lived-experience itself must be grasped. From a psychopedagogic perspective, Sonnekus<sup>24</sup> mentions the following four main essential aspects of lived-experience:

a. **Lived-experience is a human mode of being** and it is one of the categories of human openness. As such, it is a way of giving meaning to the world. Thus, a playing child, through lived-experiencing play, actively gives meaning. The pedagogically guided lived-experience of play, then, means that this giving meaning will be carried out on an increasingly higher level. Here one thinks of the lived-experience of the meaningfulness of treating the play material in responsible ways by, e.g., not destroying it, by putting it away;

b. **Lived-experience is actualized on different levels** that vary from a predominantly pathic (affective) to a more gnostic (cognitive) level. To be pedagogically meaningful, accompanying and guiding a child also must contribute to actualizing a primarily gnostic (cognitive) way of behaving;

c. **Lived-bodiliness (corporeality)** is the essence of the totality of lived-experience. This means that a child must be involved in the play situation with the completeness of his being a child;

d. **Lived-experience possesses** a character of **intentionality** and of **activity**. Sonnekus<sup>25</sup> arrives at the following provisional definition, "lived-experience is the intentionally determined, subjective, personal attitude of a person, as totality-in-function, in his communication with reality". A significant implication of this definition is that the educator should anticipate that the child must be urged to take an attitude or position in the play situation. This occurs each time he is confronted with a choice; for instance, when a person turns to the child's original experiential world or life world, it is seen that play is a way of lived-experiencing. Thus, by using "lived-experience" as an illuminating means of thought (as a category), child play can be fathomed and understood in terms of it.

Various authors have indicated that lived-experience is not a purely cognitive matter but that it also includes pathic (affective) and moral (normative) moments. These moments (aspects) of child lived-experience are not separate because each implicates and

includes the others. However, since some aspects might momentarily overshadow others, they are distinguishable.

**(i) Pathic-affective moments of lived-experience**

Straus<sup>26</sup> describes the pathic moment as an original given and as arising from the child's primordial experiencing in his direct communication with the world. Sonnekus<sup>27</sup> also speaks of a felt pre-cognitive lived-experience in communication with the world. Thus, the pathic is a person's particular, subjective, affective way of lived-experiencing in his dealings with reality. Pathic lived-experiencing is the origin or precondition for gnostic (cognitive) lived-experiencing.

As far as play is concerned, it is evident that the quality of pathic lived-experiencing is of fundamental importance. The little child is more disposed to give and to lived-experience meaning pathically, and play is one of the ways in which he goes out to the world in order to master it.

With each return to the safe, pathic space of the play situation, the lived-experience of security provides a stable foundation for a higher level of lived-experience and makes it possible for the child to explore and to break through to further horizons. Play, then, is lived-experienced play because each possibility for its actualization offers the child yet a new possibility to be actualized each time on a higher level. This means that the playing child gradually and progressively steps out of his pathic sphere of lived-experience and enters the gnostic sphere.

**(ii) Gnostic-cognitive lived-experience**

The gnostic moment of lived-experience is cognitive in nature. It is a lived-experiencing on a more distanced level than the pathic-affective. The **gnostic** is concerned with the **what** as this is contained in the reality that is lived-experienced while the **pathic** is concerned with the **how** of being involved with this reality<sup>28</sup>.

As already indicated, to be a person is to be concerned with actualizing one's potentialities, and playing-in-the-world is a mode of being that is given as a potentiality that has to be continually actualized on a higher level. The child accomplishes this through play.

**(iii) Pathic-gnostic lived-experiencing**

The small child, for the most part, lived-experiences pathically. For the becoming child to venture, he must progressively distance himself from the safe space in which he finds himself. For this to occur, it is necessary that this space is lived-experienced as a stable world. This is because gnostic lived-experiencing can thrive only on the basis of a stable pathic-affective experiential world.

The pathic is connected more with the sensopathic; that is, the pathic is dependent on the sensory. Thus, the pathic is lived-experience qualified by the sensory. Therefore, in the play situation, the educator must require that the child use his senses and lived-experience the meaningfulness of his sensory efforts.

To the extent that a child's becoming flourishes, his pathic lived-experience undergoes a change in structure. The pathic acquires a more controlled flavor because there is a move away from the immediate sensory. With each elevation in level, through meaningful sensory efforts, e.g., related lived-experiences will show an ever differing quality until eventually the pathic can be described as affectivity. This change gives impetus to all of the cognitive activities.

Just as there is a becoming from a pathic to an affective actualization of lived-experience, there also is a (correlated) becoming from a gnostic to a cognitive actualization. Then, we prefer to speak of a gnostic-cognitive lived-experiencing. Cognitive lived-experience has affective lived-experience as a fundamental foundation out of which qualitatively different levels of lived-experiencing are actualized, but also qualitatively different pathic affective levels are actualized via gnostic-cognitive lived-experiences. As far as play is concerned, as becoming occurs, the pathic undergoes a qualitative change in structure that serves to support the cognitive ways of lived-experiencing (and playing).

#### **(iv) Normative ways of lived-experiencing**

No lived-experience of meaning, attribution of meaning, taking an attitude, as the actualization of intentionality, can occur without norms. The child lived-experiences only what is of value to him. He gives sense and meaning to what is valuable and in this way it is elevated to a norm-for-him.

Sonnekus<sup>29</sup> and Pretorius<sup>30</sup> point to the unity between pathic and gnostic lived-experiencing on the one hand, and normative lived-

experiencing on the other hand, and they understand that normative lived-experiencing also is attributing and experiencing (receiving) meaning. Thus, normative lived-experiencing essentially is concerned with the child's involvement with the demands of propriety or norms. Both the child and the adult must comply with particular demands of propriety. If the adult exemplifies these demands they will be and become meaningful to the child. If the child is disposed to live up to the demands of propriety, they will become "alive" for him (Langeveld).

The child, as such, is not placed at the center of the educative situation; but neither can norms be lived up to and enforced without taking into account the nature of being a child. In the educative situation, the child, indeed, is in the foreground but the norms are at the center.

Educating through play, then, is a normative matter. Through play, the child is introduced to norms. His life becomes "norm centered" so that eventually he lives and experiences the norm-image of adulthood. Just as adulthood, as the aim of education, is normative, through play it also is a normative concept<sup>31</sup>.

### 3.5 BECOMING: LIVED-EXPERIENCE AS BECOMING

The term "becoming" is preferred in contemporary pedagogic thought to the naturalistic term "development". Landman<sup>31a</sup> describes becoming as an elevation in dialogue, a change in the level of the child's dialogue with his world.

Langeveld, in his anthropological axiom that a child is someone who himself wants to be someone, and that he is dependent on education, recognizes the child's own role in his becoming **and** that he cannot be or become someone, as he should, on his own without the help and support of an adult. Thus, becoming is co-influenced by educating.

Following Sonnekus, self-actualization and guided-actualization are accomplished by "lived-experience as becoming". The lived-experiencing child continually takes an attitude during his becoming and in doing this, he is aware that he becomes. Elevation in becoming, as elevation in dialogue, is determined on the one hand by his own contribution and on the other hand by the adult's educative participation. The adult uses, among other things, play

and language (conversation) as forms of his guided actualization of the child's becoming.

This study especially is concerned with play as a form of actualization, but play goes hand-in-hand with language. The aspects of lived-experience within which these ways of actualization are implemented vary across sensopathic, pathic, affective, sensognostic, gnostic, cognitive, and normative levels of lived-experiencing. As far as these aspects of live-experience are concerned, attention must be called to the sensopathic level of sensing on which the young child initially becomes involved in and lived-experiences his world. The biological growth of the child is closely related to this sensopathic lived-experiencing. That is, the child lived-experiences growth in such a way that he assumes an attitude toward it and becomes conscious of it. This also means that he continually attributes new significance to his bodily-pathic experiencing and this is lived- experienced as meaning. The child's becoming can be described in terms of a number of ways of actualization to which this phenomenon gives rise.

**(a) The biological moment**

Bodiliness or corporeality is the center of lived experiencing. Linschoten indicates that the lived-world, also known as the field of consciousness, always has as its center the human body, e.g., as the center of seeing and acting. All lived-experiences of time, space, feelings, thoughts are rooted in bodily activity.

**(b) Exploration-as-lived-experienced-becoming**

Exploration means to go out to the world, to inquire about and to survey it. At first, such exploration is bodily, e.g., when a child crawls, walks, views, perceives. Langeveld indicates that exploration especially is the result of a child's lived-experiencing of security arising from overcoming his helplessness.

Exploration is an emotional actualization inseparable from the bodily. Even so, the child explores in sensopathic, pathic, and affective but also in sensognostic, gnostic, cognitive (as well as normative) ways. According to Sonnekus<sup>32</sup>, this exploration varies in level from the sensopathic to the cognitive. Consequently, the actualization of play and the related actualization of language (on the different levels of lived-experience) are used in his exploration-as-lived-experienced-becoming.

**(c) Emancipation-as-lived-experienced-becoming**

According to Langeveld<sup>33</sup> the principle of emancipation is embedded in the principle of exploration which actually means that in his exploration "the child himself wants to be someone". This anthropological pronouncement by Langeveld refers to a primordial (original) way of child-being and is thus present from the beginning.

Sonnekus<sup>34</sup> says that it is meaningful that the child, in his exploration-as-lived-experienced-becoming, continually lived - experiences that he himself is, will be, and will become someone. Here there is a lived-experiencing of self that is actualized across the range of the different levels of lived-experience.

**(d) Distancing-as-lived-experienced-becoming**

Viewed from the perspective of lived-experience all elevations in level, or becoming-as-elevation-of-dialogue, mean a **distancing**. The child's entire becoming is constructed upon distancing. At birth, the baby already is distanced from his mother when the umbilical cord is cut. Hereafter, he must and will surmount his own helplessness and he does this through attaining safety and security. He explores and gradually emancipates himself by wanting to be someone.

Entering school and identifying with others are additional examples of distancing, and this course of becoming is continued until he becomes an adult. Distancing means to lived-experience on a higher level and to take a more ordered (i.e., cognitive) attitude.

**(e) Differentiation-as-lived-experienced-becoming**

Here differentiation must be seen as a child intentionally taking an attitude or position toward himself. Sonnekus<sup>35</sup> says that differentiation refers to the different ways a child is directed in his becoming, e.g., in bodily, in pathic-affective, in gnostic-cognitive ways. The processes of bodily growth remain at the child's disposal but their actualization occurs by means of "differentiation-as-lived-experienced-becoming" in the form of different intentionalities. The child himself differentiates his becoming by means of sensing, attending, perceiving, thinking, imagining and fantasizing, and remembering, among other ways.

**(f) Objectifying-as-lived-experienced-becoming**

To comprehend objectifying-as-lived-experienced-becoming it is necessary to understand that a small child initially does not enter a

distanced world. Child and world are one and everything "belongs to me"; thus, he doesn't understand what it means to share with another. Gradually he arrives at an elevation of level as distancing and then he can "step out of" his own bodiliness and, on the basis of his existence or self-consciousness (as spiritual dimension) he is able to view himself "objectively". He is able to enter such an objective lived-experience of self-judgment by means of his potential cognitive ways of being because of his intentional directedness and differentiation.

Becoming is an existential fact of child being and also is reflected in his play in that he must and will play. However, in his play and in his becoming, both viewed as an elevation in level, he is dependent on the assistance of an adult. This means that becoming also is co-defined by play in educative situations.

Now that attention has been given to lived-experience as a psychopedagogic category, the idea of an experiential world must be examined more closely. In order to clarify the concept of "experiential world", it is necessary that one understand, from a psychopedagogic perspective, the concepts "experiencing" and "life world".

### **3.6 EXPERIENTIAL WORLD**

#### **(a) Experiencing**

The world originally experienced by the child must be sought phenomenologically because it is a world in which the data of experience are knowable in their still original, primordial forms. This involves the child's prescientific, primordial experiencing in his primordial situation. In the contemporary literature, the concept "experiencing" is used in confusing ways; thus, it is necessary to trace its origin<sup>36</sup>.

In its Old Indian origin, the word "psu" means breath and "ug" means to travel or navigate. Psyche, then, means the "breath that travels". The words "travel" (vaar) and "experience" (ervaar) are linked to the words "conduct" or "comportment" (voer). To "travel" means to move toward and to be in motion; it implies to "reach" (some place or thing). With reference to the above meaning of "travel" (vaar), the child, via his psychic life, is able to know through experiencing that which manifests itself.

Aristotle describes experiencing as the basis for all knowing. He contends that the beginning of all learning is rooted in experiencing because the particulars available in perception become generalized and explicated to the level of valid knowledge through experiencing.

Husserl shows that insight into a phenomenon such as experiencing only is possible if one takes intentionality into account. This intentionality is interpreted by him as the movement of a person to live reality and in this way to provide evidence in the acts of consciousness, i.e., in learning to know this reality. Therefore, Husserl speaks of an act of consciousness as a matter of human intentionality. He describes the connection between learning to know and experience as follows: to learn to know reality, i.e., to go out to reality as intentionality is the most primary of all human actions. To know means to have an understanding of reality at one's disposal. Such going out to reality implies action directed to mastering this reality. This act of consciousness includes perceiving but it also leads to experiential involvements by which scientific knowledge becomes possible. A person's active going out to reality, therefore, is an original mode of living and, as such, is a precondition for knowing. Thus, Husserl contends that it is not possible to understand reality without experiencing it. By implication, this means that experiencing places one in a position to question an unknown (aspect of) reality in meaningful ways.

By virtue of one's being-in-the-world, experiencing puts one in a position to be able to master and control reality through the things with which one becomes involved. This allows for the further possibility of discovering the essentials of things from the things themselves. As a result, a person's primary interest in reality is heightened, which, in turn, decisively influences the relationships he creates with reality. In these relationships with reality, human intentionality manifests itself in its essentials (Heidegger), especially concerning the scope of these relationships. In the life of the child, his play experiences actually are his first and fundamental understanding of things, and, therefore, his primary relationships with reality are disclosed by and displayed in his play.

It also is meaningful to note that each person's experiences of reality are original. A complete view of and insight into a particular aspect of reality merely on the basis of perceiving is impossible because, as Husserl shows, aspects not yet perceived and experienced cannot merely be assumed to exist. Those aspects that

one cannot perceive but yet are assumed to exist are called anticipations by Husserl.

Anticipation is an essential aspect of experiencing, especially in the sense that it is a pre-understanding of the concrete experiencing and experiential meaning such that these anticipations give rise to additional experiential possibilities.

At this point, the question arises about the relation between experiencing and lived-experiencing as it appears in the reality of educating as the latter is actualized in the child's play.

### **(b) The relation between experiencing and lived-experience**

The issue of lived-experience is of particular significance because its actualization, as explicated by Sonnekus<sup>37</sup>, is manifested in the child's activities, including play. In this connection, Sonnekus mentions three psychopedagogical themes:

- (i) the stream of lived-experience varies regarding the pathic-affective and the gnostic-cognitive moments;
- (ii) lived-experience is a matter of meaning. The stream of lived-experience, as a continuous giving of meaning, also is a matter of reasonable and meaningful content;
- (iii) lived-experience implies **understanding** (Heidegger) and **attunement**. This means that the mutual relationship between understanding and existential sensitivity (moodness) must be discernible, and these forms of living must manifest themselves in education. In searching for what constitutes the foundation of childlike lived-experience, Sonnekus includes learning to know. The educator intercepts lived-experiencing, sometimes by means of play, in order to help the child learn to know. Experiencing, in the first place, assumes knowing, especially in the sense that this knowing is a gathering and ordering of available data so a conscious judgment can be made.

To be able to experience means to be able to do, to be able to act in a situation. Play that is supported by experiencing is no blind action but one that follows the appeal of the givens (data) that call and speak from the situation. Experiencing indicates controlling and is not merely a matter of knowing but also of doing. Thus, play is a matter of a child's knowing "play", and it assumes activity and a

place where this play activity can be actualized. The place for play at the Child Guidance Clinic is the playroom (see Chapter 5).

Experiencing also assumes thinking and thinking, as such, is impossible without an experiential foundation. A person without experience is inconceivable, at least within the framework of pedagogics. Consequently, there also is no child without experience and lived-experience.

Experiencing, as such, cannot be communicated; all that is communicated is the **result** of experiencing. The child's, and especially the little child's, way of communicating is actualized through play on the different levels already mentioned. This discussion is equally valid for lived-experience.

When one works with the concepts experience and lived-experience one is involved with reciprocal concepts. Thus, lived-experience can arise from experience but it also constitutes the origin of experience, especially in a pathic respect. Lived-experience, thus, can lead back to experience, but on the other hand, experience also can arise from lived-experience. These aspects, then, are reciprocal.

### (c) Life world

Sonnekus<sup>38</sup> contends that the child's original experiences are rooted in his life world. These original experiences, then, are viewed as prescientific experiences in his life world. According to Sonnekus, the life world is the world that is intentionally established and constituted by each subject in his relationships to the beings to which he directs himself. The subject is united with all such beings by intentionality, is not isolated from them, and, as such, the life world is the primordial ground for one's own living, and it is pre-given to all viewing, knowing, reflecting, and to all science<sup>39</sup>.

To fathom the existential sense of child play one has to go to the child's life world. In the life world one sees that the child lived-experiences and that play is a way of lived-experiencing. Lived-experience always is the lived-experience of something and this something is the child's experiential world<sup>40</sup>. In one's search for the pedagogic, existential character of play, attention first has to be given to the child's experiential world which now is possible because the key concepts of "experience" and "life world" have been illuminated.

#### **(d) Experiential world of the child**

The total life world cannot be lived-experienced all at once. At the moment of lived-experiencing, as a moment of giving meaning and taking an attitude, the life world becomes an experiential world<sup>41</sup>. Thus, the experiential world is a momentary landscape. Pretorius<sup>42</sup> indicates the dialectic relationship between the world of our lived-experience and the child who lived-experiences; there is no experiential world without a person, and also no person can exist without an experiential world. Thus, the experiential world is the life world as it is momentarily lived<sup>43</sup>.

Pretorius views the experiential world as a slice of reality that a person lived-experiences by taking an attitude toward and giving meaning to it<sup>44</sup>. Sonnekus<sup>45</sup> also emphasizes that by giving and experiencing meaning, the child creates an experiential world as a momentary slice of his life world, which is viewed as a potential experiential world. Where the life world is a horizon of familiarity, the experiential world is the continually changing, continuous, total reality with which the person at a particular moment is intentionally involved and to which he takes an attitude (pathic, gnostic, normative) and to which he gives meaning within this horizon (life world).

Childlike openness, incompleteness and given potentialities make his becoming possible and put him in a position to continually ascribe new meanings (to what is experienced). The adequate actualization of each moment of play actualizes lived-experience and, as such, constitutes an experiential world. When a child creates or constitutes for himself an experiential world this means that he constructs, creates, and constitutes relationships with reality in pathic, gnostic, and normative ways. The constitution of an experiential world means an elevation of the form of dialogue and points to an elevation in level through play.

In revealing the anthropological categories of intentionality and actualization, as well as the psychopedagogic categories of lived-experience and lived-experience-as-becoming, one now has the underlying preconditions, i.e., possible differentiated ways in which the playing child discloses himself as an open possibility in the life world.

Now, an additional task is to show how play is used as (i) a medium of pedotherapeutic evaluation, and (ii) a pedotherapeutic medium

for the disturbed child in his world. Thus, in the next chapter, child play will be viewed from a pedotherapeutic perspective. For it really to be "pedagogic", the evaluation, first, must be educative in nature. This means that the evaluation must be implemented in such a way that fundamental pedagogic essences are thereby also actualized. In the second place, the evaluation must be pedotherapeutic in nature; i.e., the evaluation must be actualized in such a way that it already is a form of pedotherapy.

The following chapter is divided as follows:

The theme "pedotherapeutic perspective" is broken down into two subparts, namely, (1) play as a mode of pedotherapeutic evaluation in which attention is given to the educative and pedotherapeutic possibilities of play, and (2) play as a form of pedotherapy.

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- <sup>10</sup> See Van der Stoep, F., op. cit., 52.
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  - (b) Landman en Kilian, **Leerboek vir die opvoedkunde student**, 140-141.
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